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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-2258
___________
CHANDER KANT,
Appellant
v.
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY;
KOUSOULAS & ASSOCIATES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-00-cv-05204)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 8, 2011
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 8, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Chander Kant appeals pro se from several orders entered by the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm
the district court’s orders.

I.
In October 23, 2000, this litigation commenced in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey when Kant filed a pro se complaint, alleging that his
employer, Seton Hall University, discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thereafter, on February 23, 2001, Kousoulas
and Associates, P.C., entered into a retainer agreement with Kant whereby it agreed to
represent him and Kant agreed to pay a fee of $15,000 plus either 20 percent of any
recovery, or attorneys’ fees as awarded by the court.
Although many of Kant’s claims against Seton Hall were dismissed, his retaliation
claim proceeded to trial. He obtained an $80,000 judgment, which was entered on April
11, 2006. Kousoulas, with Kant’s assent, filed an application for costs and attorneys’
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). However, Kant discharged Kousoulas prior to
the fee petition hearing. Kousoulas thereafter filed a motion to intervene to protect its
interest in the attorneys’ fees. At the July 2006 fee petition hearing, Kant’s new counsel
argued for a reduction in the amount to be awarded, but stated that Kant did not otherwise
object to the fee application. 1 On July 18, 2006, the district court awarded counsel fees
of $124,834.95 and costs of $2,595.41. The July 18th order also denied Kousoulas’s
motion to intervene, stating that “an attorney, independent of his or her client, has no
personal right to an award of statutory attorneys’ fees.” The district court did note,
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Kant discharged his second attorney in October 2006.
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however, that “plaintiff’s former attorneys may have a separate claim pursuant to the
retainer agreement entered into with plaintiff for their fees.”
Seton Hall and Kant appealed from the April 11, 2006 judgment, which this Court
affirmed on May 29, 2008. (C.A. Nos. 06-4448 & 06-4464.) Seton Hall then paid to
Kant the $80,000 judgment and deposited the fee award with the district court. Seton
Hall is no longer part of the litigation.
Soon thereafter, because Kant refused to authorize payment of the fee award to
Kousoulas, Kousoulas sent to Kant a fee arbitration notice pursuant to New Jersey Court
Rule 1:20A-6. When Kant did not commence fee arbitration proceedings, Kousoulas
filed a petition in the district court for determination and enforcement of an attorney fee
lien pursuant to New Jersey law. On January 27, 2009, Kant filed an answer to the fee
lien petition as well as a counterclaim against Kousoulas, asserting claims of legal
malpractice and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.
On March 30, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s tortious interference claim
as time-barred. And on September 9, 2009, the district court granted Kousoulas’s motion
for summary judgment as to its attorney fee lien and its motion to dismiss Kant’s legal
malpractice claim. The September 9th order also denied as moot Kant’s motion for
default judgment. Kousoulas then filed a motion for release of the funds, and Kant
moved for reconsideration of the September 2009 order. On March 30, 2010, the district
court granted Kousoulas’s motion and denied Kant’s motion for reconsideration.
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Kant now appeals from the district court’s March 30, 2009, September 9, 2009,
and March 30, 2010 orders. 2
II.
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE FEE LIEN PETITION
On September 9, 2009, the district court granted Kousoulas’s motion for summary

judgment as to its fee lien petition after determining that the retainer agreement, which
stated that fees awarded are to be paid to Kousoulas, was an enforceable contract. 3 We
exercise plenary review over a district court’s conclusions of law and review its findings
of fact for clear error. See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316
F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003). In doing so, we employ the same standard used by the
district court in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers
Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
As the district court recognized, in New Jersey the relationship between an
attorney and client is contractual. See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union, 679
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We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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We note that the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over
the fee dispute. See Kalyawongsa v. Moffett, 105 F.3d 283, 287-88 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that “although attorneys’ fee arrangements are contracts under state law, the
federal court’s interest in fully and fairly resolving the controversies before it requires
courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over fee disputes that are related to the main
action”); Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 212, 217-18 (3d Cir.
1987).
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A.2d 1188, 1196 (N.J. 1996) (“Agreements between attorneys and clients concerning the
client-lawyer relationship generally are enforceable, provided the agreements satisfy both
the general requirements for contracts and the special requirements of professional
ethics.”). And in determining that Kousoulas’s fee lien petition should be enforced, the
district court explained that:
The facts of record establish that Petitioner has rendered legal services to
Kant pursuant to the Retainer Agreement. As a result of these services,
Kant obtained a damages award of $80,000.00. Additionally, Kant and
Petitioner filed a fee application and the Court granted said application.
The facts presented establish that Kant agreed to turn over any fees
awarded by the Court to Petitioner. The fees are to be paid by Seton Hall
University, and, therefore, there is no loss incurred by Kant. Kant has
provided neither legal authority nor facts to support his position that he
does not have to turn over the fees awarded to Petitioner.
Kant asserts that the district court made several erroneous findings of fact in
making its decision, including that he “agreed to turn over any fees awarded by the Court
to [Kousoulas].” In support, he references several statements that he made regarding his
continuing assertion that he, not Kousoulas, should be awarded attorney’s fees.
However, the district court’s finding is correct, as Kant agreed “to pay [Kousoulas]
twenty percent (20%) of the sum recovered, . . . or any legal fees awarded to [Kousoulas]
by the Court, whichever is greater,” when he signed the retainer agreement.
Further, although Kant correctly asserts that “courts scrutinize contracts between
attorneys and clients to ensure that they are fair,” Cohen, 679 A.2d at 1196, he does not
argue that the retainer agreement itself is unfair or unethical. Rather, Kant’s primary
argument appears to be that Kousoulas should not be awarded fees because Kant is likely
to succeed on his counterclaims. However, Kant’s success or failure on his
5

counterclaims has no bearing on the fee award paid by Seton Hall to Kousoulas pursuant
to the retainer agreement.
Moreover, despite Kant’s argument to the contrary, he is not eligible for the
attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), as it is well-established that, “[s]ince
the object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards
must accrue to counsel.” Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977)
(receded from on other grounds in Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1980)).
Kant’s remaining arguments are meritless. Therefore, we will affirm the district
court’s orders granting Kousoulas’s motion for summary judgment as to its fee lien
petition and denying Kant’s motion for reconsideration of that decision.
B.

DISMISSAL OF KANT’S COUNTERCLAIMS
In its March 30, 2009 and September 9, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s

counterclaims to Kousoulas’s fee lien petition. We review de novo the dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim. Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181,
188 (3d Cir. 2010).
(1)

Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

In January 2009, Kant asserted a claim against Kousoulas for tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage. He asserted that in January 2001, he received a
one-year appointment as a visiting scholar at Columbia University, and that in the spring
of 2002, the senior faculty in the Economics Department voted to hire him. In May 2002,
Kant told Kousoulas that he was likely to receive a full-time faculty appointment.
6

However, within a week after Kant’s conversation with Kousoulas, Columbia University
advised him that he had not been selected for the position. Due to the timing of these two
events, Kant believes that Kousoulas prevented him from obtaining the job at Columbia
University. On March 30, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s counterclaim as timebarred because it was filed beyond either New York’s or New Jersey’s statute of
limitations for such claims.
The district court’s decision is correct. Because the district court determined that
Kant’s claim was time-barred under either New York’s or New Jersey’s statute of
limitations, it did not engage in a choice-of-law analysis. The New Jersey statute of
limitations for a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage is
six years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1. New York has a three-year statute of limitations
for such claims. Besicorp Ltd. v. Kahn, 736 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
Under New Jersey law, “a statute of limitations begins to run when all elements of a
cause of action are present, or, more plainly, from the moment of the wrong.” Michaels
v. State of N.J., 955 F. Supp. 315, 326 (D.N.J. 1996) (internal citation and quotation
omitted). Similarly, in New York, “a tort claim accrues as soon as the claim becomes
enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.”
IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 140 (N.Y. 2009).
Here, Kant’s claim accrued in May 2002, when he was told that he did not receive the
position at Columbia University. Kant, did not, however, bring his tortious interference
claim until January 27, 2009. The claim was therefore untimely under either New York
or New Jersey law. Further, the district court properly determined that Kant did not
7

provide grounds to toll the statute of limitations on equitable grounds or delay it under
the discovery rule.
(2)

Legal Malpractice

Kant also claimed that Kousoulas had committed legal malpractice by, among
other things, creating an expectation that he would recover $300,000 in damages from
Seton Hall and failing to amend the original complaint to include a request for punitive
damages. The district court dismissed the claim because Kant failed to produce an
Affidavit of Merit, as is required by New Jersey law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27.
Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff alleging malpractice by a licensed professional
must, “provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that
there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or
exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell
outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.” Id.
New Jersey does, however, provide that “[i]n lieu of an affidavit, the plaintiff may
provide a sworn statement that, after written request, the defendant failed to provide the
plaintiff with records that have a substantial bearing on the preparation of the affidavit.”
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-28). Further, an affidavit is not required when the case turns on common
knowledge. “The factual predicate for a common knowledge case is one where the
carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and
ordinary experience.” Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d
Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). If, however, “the claim’s
8

underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard
of care applicable to that specific profession,” an affidavit of merit is required. Couri v.
Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134, 1141 (N.J. 2002). Kant unsuccessfully argues both that he
substantially complied with the affidavit of merit requirement and that an affidavit is not
required because his claim turns on common knowledge. 4
First, to be relieved of the obligation to file an affidavit of merit, Kant was
required to file a sworn statement that Kousoulas had failed to provide the documents that
could form the basis of an affidavit of merit. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53-28. He claims
that he provided such a statement. However, the document that he relies upon is an
unsworn statement that he attached to a motion for default judgment, in which he asserted
that Kousoulas had not complied with the district court’s scheduling order regarding
discovery and other pretrial matters. Apart from being unsworn, the statement does not
assert that Kousoulas’s alleged noncompliance with the scheduling order had any effect
on Kant’s ability to obtain an affidavit of merit, much less reference the affidavit of merit
statute. Therefore, this document does not constitute a sworn statement under New
Jersey law.
Kant also argues that because his claim sounded in contract and because its merit
was “apparent from a reading of [his] complaint,” no affidavit of merit was required.
This argument lacks merit. His claim, which alleged that Kousoulas failed to adequately
represent his interests in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, required proof of a deviation from the
4

We have determined that Kousoulas’s remaining arguments regarding the
affidavit of merit statute, which include an assertion that the statute is unconstitutional,
are meritless.
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professional standard of care and thus required an affidavit of merit. See Couri, 801 A.2d
at 1151. The case did not fall within the “common knowledge” doctrine because the
alleged professional failings of Kousoulas (including her legal judgment) were not so
apparent that no expert was required to demonstrate a deviation from the accepted
standard of care. See Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 500-01 (N.J. 2001).
C.

DENIAL OF MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Finally, Kant’s assertion that this Court should vacate the District Court’s

dismissal of his motion for default judgment as moot is meritless. Because the district
court entered judgment in favor of Kousoulas, it properly denied as moot Kant’s motion
for default judgment. See Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths,
Forgers & Helpers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that “questions of
mootness are considered under a plenary standard of review”).
III.
In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s orders. Kant
has also filed several motions before this Court, including a motion to reconsider our
decision to dismiss his motion for a stay of execution of the district court’s judgment.
We now deny all of Kant’s pending motions as moot. We grant Kousoulas’s motion to
file a supplemental brief.
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